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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

KIP LANE MASSEY,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 950431-CA
Trial No. 951900059FS
Priority No. 2

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) , whereby a defendant in a
district court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of
Appeals from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other
than a first degree or capital felony.

See

also

Utah R. Crim.

P. 26(2) (a) .
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
The following constitutional provisions and statutes are
contained in the text of this brief or in Addendum A:
Utah
U.S.
Utah
Utah

Const, art. I, § 12
Const, amend. V
Code Ann. § 76-6-408
Code Ann. § 76-10-509.9

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the court err in not granting the motion for a new
trial (or did the case at bar fulfill the requirements for a new
trial)?

(Issue preserved at R 84-85; 103-06; 461-68.)

Standard of Review:
"Where disinterested testimony on the vital
point in a case is very scant, newly discovered
testimony on that point appearing from
affidavits in support of the motion for a new
trial to be apparently reliable, . . . and it
appears likely that such evidence would change
the result, a new trial should be granted.
While the granting or refusing of the motion
lies in the sound discretion of the court, where
there is a grave suspicion that justice may have
miscarried because of the lack of enlightenment
on a vital point which new evidence will
apparently supply, and the other elements
attendant on obtaining a new trial on the ground
of newly discovered evidence are present, it
would be an abuse of sound discretion not to
grant the same."
State v. James,

819 P.2d 781, 800 n.41 (Utah 1988) (citations

omitted).
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND A WRITTEN OPINION
State

v. James addresses the requirements for a motion

for a new trial, but the case at bar presents an additional
element.

The evidence here contains a procedural twist because a

co-defendant, who was previously allowed only to make a twosentence statement, has since pleaded guilty to the crime at
issue.

At the time of the motion for a new trial, the

co-defendant no longer desired Fifth Amendment protection.
Hence, the new trial requirement of being "discoverable and
produceable" is an issue which has not yet been addressed under
facts like those in Mr. Massey's case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for
2

theft by receiving stolen property (Count I ) , a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408, and sale of a
firearm to a juvenile (Count II), a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-509.9.

See (R 4-5; 39; 64-

65; 78-83).
On or about October 31, 1994, the State filed the above
charges against Casey Sanslow and Kip Massey.
case, however, was resolved separately.

(R 4-5).

Each

(R 132-427; 436-48) .

On April 11, 1995, Mr. Massey requested a continuance of
his trial date, after learning that Mr. Sanslow would enter a
guilty plea to the same charge in six days.
lower court denied Mr. Massey's motion.

(R 26; 100). The

(R 26; 101).

On April 14, 1995, a jury convicted Mr. Massey of both
of the above Counts.

(R 64-65; 430-33).

On April 17, 1995,

Casey Sanslow pleaded guilty to the sale of a firearm to a
juvenile Count, a conviction identical to the one contested in
Kip Massey's trial.

(R 5; 39; 437-45), x

On June 5, 1995, the court sentenced Mr. Massey to an
indeterminate prison term of one-to-fifteen years on Count I, and
zero-to-five years on Count II.

The court then suspended the

imposition of both terms, which were imposed concurrently, and it
instead placed him on probation for 24 months and ordered him to
pay various fines and fees.

(R 78-83; 458-59) .

On June 14, 1995, Mr. Massey filed a motion for a new

1

Mr. Sanslow's other charge was dismissed pursuant to a plea
bargain agreement. (R 437).
3

trial.

(R 84-85).

The court denied his motion on July 31, 1995.

(R 84-85; 103-06; 461-68).

Other procedural facts are more fully

addressed below.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On or about October 31, 1994, the State filed a criminal
Information against two co-defendants, Kip Lane Massey and Casey
L. Sanslow.

(R 4-5).

were identical.

The charges filed against both defendants

(R 4-5).

The theft by receiving stolen property charge, Count I,
and the sales of a firearm to a juvenile charge, Count II, both
alleged that the offense occurred on or about June 21, 1994.
4-5).

(R

The elements and allegations for both Counts were the same

for each defendant.

(R 4-5) .

For both counts, the probable cause statement of the
Information stated in pertinent part:
Someone broke into the home of Terry Sanslow
on June 19, 1994 and took a .22 cal. Dillinger
pistol.
On August 30, 1994 Defendant Casey Sanslow
admitted to your affiant [Detective Deven
Higgins] after Miranda that he sold the gun to
Bryan and Grant Kirby. The Kirby brothers are
thirteen and fifteen years old.
Bryan and Grant Kirby told your affiant that
the gun was actually purchased from Kip Massey
on June 21, 1994.
(R 5) .
Even after Casey Sanslow had admitted that he was
responsible for selling the firearm to a juvenile, (R 5, 296),
the State still continued to prosecute both Casey and Kip for the
4

same offense, Count II.

(R 132-427; 436-48).

Although the

Counts against the co-defendants remained the same, their cases
were apparently separated in the bindover.

(R 5, 461). As

summarized in the probable cause statement, the seller of the
firearm was either Casey or Kip--both persons could not have been
the seller.

(R 5). Kip Massey always maintained his innocence.

(R 348-49; 371).
Casey Sanslow's involvement in the case at bar is tied
to the fact that his father owned the missing .22 caliber gun.
Terry Sanslow suspected that the "someone" who broke into his
home and stole the gun was his son, Casey.

(R 202).

Additional

stolen property included electronic items, jewelry, and other
firearms.

(R 201).

Salt Lake City.

Terry resided in Price, Utah; Casey lived in

(R 200, 202).

An unrelated incident also led police to Casey.

Officer

Dukatz was on patrol on August 25, 1995, at around midnight, when
he stopped and questioned two persons who appeared to be
juveniles, 13 year old Greg Brian Kirby and 15 year old Grant
Kirby.

(R 264-67).

The officer's search of Greg Brian Kirby

produced a gun, a .22 caliber derringer pistol.

(R 267).

Following a check of the gun's serial numbers, the
officers learned that the gun belonged to Terry Sanslow.
81).

(R 280-

Since Casey had been a suspect in the Price burglary, his

name resurfaced after the gun was recovered.

(R 285-86) .

Casey denied committing the burglary, but he admitted
that he had been in possession of the derringer pistol.
5

(R 287) .

Casey also acknowledged that he had sold the gun to the Kirbys.
(R 291, 296).
By contrast, Grant Kirby claimed that he had bought the
gun from Kip Massey.

(R 269). According to Detective Higgins,

even though Casey declared against his own interest that Kip had
nothing to do with the gun, the detective still charged Kip
because Grant's story had not changed.

(R 296).

The detective, however, did not know that Grant and
Travis Kirby were selling stolen items (e.g. stereo equipment) to
Mike Gillespie in exchange for marijuana.

(R 341, 357).

Grant

accused Kip of selling the gun only after Kip had kicked Mike out
of the house for dealing drugs.
roommates.

Mike and Kip were once

(R 341, 352, 357-59).

Grant's accusation also

protected his 17 year old brother, Travis, from liability since
Travis purchased the gun that police had found on Greg, another
Kirby brother.

(R 242, 267, 363); (R 208) (Grant's accusation

shielded Travis from the firearm sale to a juvenile charge).
Kip Massey's trial was scheduled for April 13, 1995.
Prior to trial, however, Mr. Massey sought a continuance after
learning that on April 17, 1995, Casey Sanslow would plead guilty
to the same charge at issue (Count II) in Mr. Massey's trial.
(R 5, 99, 441). Mr. Massey's motion was denied.

(R 26).

Casey Sanslow indicated that he would "take the Fifth
Amendment" protection against self-incrimination if his testimony
was required before the entry of his guilty plea.

(R 99).

Casey

Sanslow did not testify at Mr. Massey's trial, although Casey's
6

two-sentence statement was offered in his absence without the
benefit of an accompanying explanation:
I, Casey Sanslow, had in my possession on
June 21st a little .22 handgun which I sold to
the Kirby twins for $35 with a gun case, and Kip
Massey was not and had nothing to do with it.
At the time I did know that it was a stolen gun.
Signed: Casey Sanslow.
8-30-1994.
(R 296).
The State attacked Casey Sanslow's statement, however,
stressing repeatedly that it was Kip, not Casey, who had sold the
gun to the Kirbys.

(R 217, 246). The prosecution's closing

argument summarized its contentions:
And I [the State] asked both of these young
boys, fifteen and seventeen years old [Grant and
Travis Kirby], I said, "Are you sure? Are you
sure the person that sold you this gun was this
young man, Kip Massey?"
And both of them said, "Yes."
Said, "Are you sure it wasn't somebody else? It
wasn't Casey Sanslow? It wasn't somebody else
in the house?"
And both of them said, "We're sure the person
that sold us the gun was the defendant, Kip
Massey."
(R 400).
The written statement by Casey Sanslow, who was at the
time of trial unable and unwilling to testify on behalf of Kip,
apparently lacked the force of in-person testimony.

On Friday,

April 14, 1995, the jury convicted Mr. Massey of "theft by
receiving stolen property" (Count I) and "firearm sales to
juvenile" (Count II).

(R 64-65; 429-35).
7

On Monday, April 17, 1995, Casey Sanslow entered a
guilty plea to the exact same "firearm sales to juvenile" Count,
(R 5, 437), even though Casey could have used the State's own
words in defense of his charge.

Casey's plea was before a judge

different from the one who had presided over Kip's trial.

In

another proceeding, Casey later admitted taking the .22 caliber
derringer pistol from his father's home.

(R 437).

During Mr. Massey's sentencing proceeding, Casey Sanslow
again repeated that Kip was not responsible:
THE COURT:
came from?

Did Mr. Massey know where those guns

MR. SANSLOW:
THE COURT:
then?

No, he did not, Your Honor.
How did you get them in the house,

MR. SANSLOW: I was down fishing on a fishing
trip with my father a week prior. That's when I
took the gun.
(R 457).
On June 14, 1995, Mr. Massey filed a motion for a new
trial.

(R 84-85).

In support of the motion, Mr. Massey filed

Casey Sanslow's affidavit which stated in relevant part:
1. I [Casey Sanslow] was charged in this case
along with Kip Lane Massey.
2.

I hired Randy Ludlow to represent me.

3. The weekend before this offense occurred, I
was in Price, Utah, visiting my father, Terry
Sanslow.
4. While I was staying at my father's house, I
took the 2.25 caliber Derringer pistol from his
collection, and brought it to Salt Lake with me.

8

5. The following week, my mother told me that
my father's home had been broken into and all
his guns had been stolen. I was worried that I
would be blamed for breaking into my father's
house if I were found with the Derringer, so I
decided to get rid of it.
6. I went over to Kip Massey's house to meet
with him and he wasn't home. I met someone on
the porch by the name of Travis Kirby and asked
him if he wanted to purchase the gun. I sold
the gun to Mr. Kirby at that time for $30.00.
7. Kip was not at home when I sold the gun to
Travis Kirby. Kip did not see the gun, because
I did not show it to him.
8. Kip told me that a detective with the Murray
Police was looking for me. I called him the
same day and went into the police station.
While I was there, I signed a statement telling
the police that I sold the gun to the Kirby's
and that Kip had nothing to do with it.
9. I entered into a plea bargain with the
District Attorney's Office to plead guilty to a
third degree felony on this case, before Judge
Tyrone E. Medley on April 17, 1995.
10. I was subpoenaed to testify at Kip Massey's
trial which was to begin on April 13, 1995. I
was advised by my attorney, Randy Ludlow, to
invoke my fifth amendment right against selfincrimination if I were called to testify.
11. I have since entered a plea on this case,
have been sentenced and am now available to
testify.
(R 103-04) (attached in Addendum B ) .
The State argued that Casey's eleven paragraph affidavit
did not offer anything different than his two sentence statement.
(R 465-66) . Mr. Massey disagreed, noting that because he was not
present at the time of the sale, only Casey could have testified
specifically about what had occurred with the Kirbys.

(R 464) .

The court denied Mr. Massey's motion for a new trial.

(R 468) .

9

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The lower court erred in not granting the motion for a
new trial.

Even with reasonable diligence, Mr. Kip Massey was

unable legally to produce Mr. Casey Sanslow's testimony.
Mr. Sanslow was protected by the Fifth Amendment, and the jury
was deprived of the opportunity to hear a full explanation of the
extent of his involvement.
Mr. Massey first requested a continuance in order to
secure Mr. Sanslow's testimony, but the court denied his request.
As evidenced by his affidavit, Casey Sanslow7s testimony was not
cumulative and it offered enlightenment on vital points contested
at trial.

Mr. Sanslow7s testimony was so important that it

rendered probable a different result on retrial.
ARGUMENT
POINT
A NEW TRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED DUE TO THE
CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF CASEY SANSLOW7S TESTIMONY
In State

v. James,

819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1988), the supreme

court expounded upon the general rule for granting a new trial:
While the granting or refusing of the motion
lies in the sound discretion of the court, where
there is a grave suspicion that justice may have
miscarried because of the lack of enlightenment
on a vital point which new evidence will
apparently supply, and the other elements
attendant on obtaining a new trial on the ground
of newly discovered evidence are present, it
would be an abuse of sound discretion not to
grant the same.
James,

819 P.2d at 800 n.41 (citations omitted).

The "other

elements attendant on obtaining a new trial" are "(1) [The
10

evidence] must be such as could not with reasonable diligence
have been discoverable and produced at the trial; (2) it must not
be merely cumulative; (3) it must be such as to render a
different result probable on the retrial of the case."

Id.

at

793 (footnote omitted).
Steven Ray James initially had been convicted of killing
his infant son.

He then moved for a new trial, alleging, inter

alia, that the testimony of State witness Ronald Peterson was
perjured.

Peterson earlier had been housed in the same jail cell

as Mr. James and "Peterson testified at trial that he overheard
defendant [James] confess to another prisoner, John Lippencott,
that he killed his son."

819 P.2d at 787, 793.

After the trial, inmate Kenneth Lisner came forward to
say that Peterson had testified falsely.

The trial court,

however, was of the opinion that Mr. James "was not convicted on
the testimony of Ronald Peterson. . . .

The Court finds that the

tests for newly discovered evidence relating to a new trial do
not exist.

Even if they did exist, . . . the outcome of this

case would not have been any different whether Ron Peterson
testified or not."

James,

819 P.2d at 800 (Howe, Associate C.J.,

concurring and dissenting).2
2

As summarized in the dissenting opinion, the evidence
relied upon by the trial judge included:
(1) the bruises and falls sustained by the baby
while in defendant's care; (2) the insensitivity
shown to the baby by defendant; (3) defendant's
anger when questioned by police and his urging [the
mother] not to give them certain information; (4)
his jealously of the baby; (5) his concern about the
11

Despite claims by the dissent that new evidence
concerning the lack of credibility of a witness should not serve
as the basis for a new trial, id.,
disagreed.

the four justice majority

The appellate court reversed and "ordered a new trial

so that defendant can place before the jury evidence that [State
witness, inmate Ronald] Peterson fabricated his testimony in
order to receive better treatment from the State, . . . "

James,

819 P.2d at 799 (Zimmerman, J., joined by Stewart and Durham,
J.J.); accord

819 P.2d at 793 (Hall, C.J.).

Evidence of Peterson' perjury was not reasonably
discoverable before Mr. James' trial.
Peterson apparently spoke to Kenneth Lisner
concerning his fabrications to the police about
two weeks before trial. He then told Lisner
that he would not go through with the lie at
trial. Lisner only discovered that Peterson had
in fact committed perjury by watching news
accounts of the trial after Peterson had already
testified.
James,

819 P.2d at 794-95. Holding that the first requirement

for a new trial was satisfied, the opinion explained that even
with due diligence such information could not have been produced.
Id.

at 794 (unreasonable to expect defense to interview all

inmates in contact with Peterson).

expense of raising the baby; (6) the fact that he
was the last person to be with the baby prior to the
baby's disappearance; (7) his elaborate explanation
for the baby's disappearance; and (8) the baby's
body found wrapped in a mattress cover which
belonged to defendant.
James,

819 P.2d at 800 (Howe, Associate C.J., dissenting).
12

The evidence also was not cumulative, notwithstanding
trial court's findings to the contrary.

"The trial judge found

that Lisner's testimony would be merely cumulative of James's
testimony that he had never had a conversation with Lippencott."
Id.

It also found "that the testimony to be presented by Lisner

went merely to the credibility of Peterson and did not present
new evidence of defendant's innocence."

Id.

The high court rejected the lower court's
interpretation, however, explaining that:
the credibility evidence went beyond refuting
the testimony of Peterson and established
independent evidence that he had deliberately
committed perjury in an attempt to subvert the
trial process to his own ends. Lisner's
testimony concerned a disputed fact that arose
between Peterson's testimony and James's,
whether or not Peterson's testimony concerning
the overheard confession was truthful.
James,

819 P.2d at 794.
The third requirement, the likelihood of a different

result, was similarly satisfied.

The evidence, "while

sufficient, [was] not overwhelming or compelling."
supra

note 2.

Id.;

cf.

"Peterson's testimony went to the heart of the

evidence against defendant."

819 P.2d at 795. Having determined

that the criteria for a new trial were met, the James court held
that "the trial court abused its discretion in denying
defendant's motion based on evidence that Peterson testified
falsely."

id.
The case at bar presents an analogous situation.

In its

order denying Mr. Massey's motion for a new trial, the trial
13

court opined:
Given [the] fact that the Court allowed the
confession in of the Co-defendant and [it]
apparently is consistent with what you indicated
his testimony would be, it gets to be an issue
of credibility. The Court will deny the motion
for a new trial.
(R 468).
While Mr. Massey does not dispute that Casey Sanslow's
two sentence confession is "consistent" with what Casey's trial
testimony would reveal, as indicated in James,

a motion for a new

trial may not be thwarted merely because evidence is believed to
be "consistent" or because it addresses credibility.

James,

See

819 P.2d at 793-95. Like the testimony of Kenneth Lisner in
James,

the testimony of Casey Sanslow in Mr. Massey's case

constituted evidence which should not have been discounted.
A.

THE EVIDENCE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED
AND PRODUCED AT MR. MASSEY'S TRIAL

Mr. Massey conceded, and the State correctly noted that
Casey Sanslow was available physically at the time of Kip's
trial.

(R 463, 465). There is a difference, however, between

being available physically and being available legally.
see generally

State

v. Menzies,

(R 463);

889 P.2d 393, 402 (Utah 1994) .

Even with due diligence, Kip Massey could not have
legally "discovered and produced" Casey Sanslow for his testimony
at Kip Massey's trial. Mr. Massey subpoenaed Casey Sanslow,
except Casey was instructed by counsel to invoke his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination if called to testify.
(R 17; 104; 188-89).

Hence, although Kip Massey was indeed aware
14

of Casey Sanslow, Casey still could not have been compelled to
"produce" testimony in person on behalf of Kip.
amend. V; Utah Const, art. I, § 1 2 .

U.S. Const,

Such testimony could have

been produced only after Casey had entered his guilty plea.

(R

104) .
In addition, Mr. Massey had attempted to use other means
to secure Casey Sanslow's testimony.

Mr. Massey also had

diligently requested a continuance of his trial, scheduled for
April 13-14, 1995, in order to allow Casey Sanslow to enter his
guilty plea on April 17, 1995.

(R 99, 436-48).

Even though such

a short interval would have given Casey the opportunity to
testify fully in the Massey proceeding, the lower court
nevertheless rejected the continuance request.
State

v. Gehring,

(R 101);

cf.

694 P.2d 599, 601 (Utah 1984) (motion for a new

trial viewed more favorably if defense had requested a
continuance in order to allow a witness to be present).
Mr. Massey's situation is more compelling than the James
case.

In James,

while there may have been "difficulties

inherent" in interviewing the 50-100 prisoners who were housed
with Ronald Peterson, such a task was at least factually
possible.

819 P.2d at 794.

In Mr. Massey's case, however, even

with the exercise of reasonable diligence, he could not legally
produce Casey Sanslow, nor was Casey required to incriminate
himself in person at Kip Massey7s trial.
for a new trial was met.

15

The first requirement

B.

CASEY SANSLOW SHOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO
PROVIDE IMPORTANT NON-CUMULATIVE EVIDENCE

The State argued that "a new trial would [not] make any
difference in this case because it's going to be essentially the
same evidence.

The evidence in his [Casey Sanslow's] Affidavit

is essentially what the Jury heard in the trial that we did in
this case."

(R 465). Contending that "[t]he Defense has told

the Court this is not newly discovered evidence [,]" the State
claimed that Mr. Massey "knew about the Co-defendant [Casey
Sanslow]".

(R 465-66).

Contrary to the State's arguments, knowing about Casey
is distinct from compelling him to testify.
see

supra

As explained above,

Point I.A., the evidence was "new" because it could not

have been used earlier, especially since Mr. Massey's request for
a continuance had been denied.

(R 101).

The State also added, "They Jury was allowed to see the
[two sentence] statement, the confession that was made by the Codefendant, Mr. [Casey] Sanslow, in which Mr. Sanslow takes full
responsibility, claims that Mr. Massey had nothing to do with
it."

(R 464-65).
Casey Sanslow's two sentence statement and his affidavit

both acknowledged responsibility, but they were not cumulative of
one another. Sanslow's brief statement said only:
I, Casey Sanslow, had in my possession on
June 21st a little .22 handgun which I sold to
the Kirby twins for $35 with a gun case, and Kip
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Massey was not and had nothing to do with it.
At the time I did know that it was a stolen gun.
Signed: Casey Sanslow.
8-30-1994.
(R 296).
By comparison, Casey's affidavit additionally summarized
how and when he took the gun, (R 103, 1 4) (his affidavit is
contained in Addendum B ) ; it explained why he wanted to get rid
of the gun, (R 104, 1 5 ) ; it gave the specifics of what had
happened and what was said, (R 104, 1 6 ) ; it revealed which Kirby
brother actually purchased the gun, (R 104, 11 6-7); it indicated
that Kip Massey was not at home at the time, nor was he ever
shown the gun, (R 104, 1 7 ) ; and it outlined the aftermath of the
incident, including the entry of his guilty plea to the firearm
sales to a juvenile offense.

(R 104, 11 8-11) .

Not only did the words of the affidavit address for the
first time matters which the jury did not consider, the jury also
was precluded from assessing the in-person testimony of Casey
Sanslow.

"Evidence from a neutral third party is not merely

cumulative of a criminal defendant's testimony.

It is of a

different kind and nature than defendant's statements, and it
certainly could have a different quality in the eyes of the
jurors who assess the credibility of the witnesses."
P.2d at 794 (footnote omitted); see

also

id.

James,

819

("The testimony of

Lisner [or in the case at bar, Sanslow] would corroborate that of
James [who was in the same position as Massey] and provide
independent evidence of his version of the facts").
17

"New" evidence also went beyond Casey's affidavit and
his in-person ability to clarify and expound on his culpability;
the new evidence additionally included Casey's recently entered
guilty plea to the "firearm sales to a juvenile" charge, (R 104,
1 9); the very same Count at issue in, and disputed by, Kip
Massey in his trial.

(R 5, 39, 437-43).

A jury should have been

able to consider the nature of Casey's admission, given its
newness and the fact that it was formally entered even after Kip
had been convicted of the same offense.
The second requirement was fulfilled.

See infra

Point I.e.

The evidence was not

cumulative.
C.

THE IN-PERSON TESTIMONY OF CASEY SANSLOW
RENDERED PROBABLE A DIFFERENT RESULT ON
RETRIAL

In contrast to its arguments at the hearing on the
motion for a new trial, at Mr. Massey's trial the State's closing
arguments suggested that Casey Sanslow's in-person testimony
would have added far more to the case than what Casey's two
sentence statement had left unanswered:
[The State:] Notice how he [Casey Sanslow]
identifies the gun. The only thing he calls it
is a little .22 handgun. This is the statement
from Casey Sanslow. Doesn't even refer to it as
a Derringer. You got to wonder whether he's
even talking about the same gun. I mean maybe
they sold so many guns, they're starting to get
confused over how many guns they sold and on
which days.
All he says is, "I, Casey Sanslow, had in my
possession on June 21st a little .22 handgun,
which I sold to the Kirby twins."
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Gosh, got to even wonder if he knew who he
sold it to. The Kirby twins? They're not
twins. They're brothers. One's fifteen. One's
seventeen. They don't look alike. You saw both
of them yesterday. And yet here in the
statement, he says, "I sold it to the Kirby
twins."
(R 408-09).
Casey's in-person trial testimony would have addressed
all of the State's questions, including the misidentification of
the Kirbys --an error also committed by the State.

(R 465) (the

State referred incorrectly to the Kirbys as the "Travis
brothers").
Kip Massey was the lone defense witness.

(R 333-89) .

Casey Sanslow would have done more than clarify his two sentence
statement, Casey also offered the only other evidence in support
of Kip Massey.

(R 103-04).

Casey was critical to countering the

State's claim that the Kirby boys were not lying:
[The State:] Now, it's interesting. The
defendant in this case, Kip Massey, says to you
[the jury], "Oh, no, no. It's not me. I never
had anything to do with this gun. I wasn't in
possession of the gun. I've never seen the gun.
I didn't sell the gun to anyone."
And so you have to say to yourself, "If
that's true, are you telling us, Kip Massey, are
you telling us that these two boys are lying,
that Grant and Travis are lying here in a
courtroom? They're not telling us the truth
about the transaction?
And he says, "Yeah, I guess they are."
And the real question is: Why? Whv? Why
would these two boys come in here, or why would
they even tell law enforcement that this is the
young man who made the sale to them if it's not
the truth?
19

(R 402-03) (emphasis added).
Without Casey Sanslow7s in-person testimony, Kip
Massey7s denials proved unpersuasive.

The jury simply accepted

Grant and Travis7 story.
Had Casey Sanslow been present, however, the juveniles7
claims would have been viewed very differently.

Instead of

evidence which simply pitted Kip's word against the story by the
two boys, the jury would have been able to hear and to see that
Casey had no reason to lie.
The inquiry would have broadened to "why would Casey
Sanslow lie?"

Casey and Kip were co-defendants charged with the

exact same crimes.

(R 5).

Casey had every reason to blame Kip.

Yet, before charges were ever filed, Casey admitted selling the
gun.

(R 5).

his guilt.

Casey then continuously and consistently confessed
(R 5; 103-04; 296; 436-48; 457).

Having already relied on the Fifth Amendment, Casey may
have further protected himself by declining, on April 17, 1995,
to enter his guilty plea.

Casey may have instead pleaded

innocent and defended himself with the April 14, 1995, Massey
verdict and the State's own closing arguments.3

Casey Sanslow

3

As indicated previously in the Statement of Facts, the
prosecution's argument singled out Kip, not Casey:
And I [the State] asked both of these young boys, fifteen
and seventeen years old [Grant and Travis Kirby], I said,
"Are you sure? Are you sure the person that sold you this
gun was this young man, Kip Massey?"
And both of them said, "Yes."
Said, "Are you sure it wasn't somebody else?
20

It wasn't

did none of the above because he knew Kip was not responsible.
(R 103-04, 296, 457) ,4

The jury never had the opportunity to

consider that Casey's guilty plea to the crimes was a formal
legal declaration which was consistent with his earlier informal
confessions.
The State's claim that Casey "took the fall" for Kip is
of no consequence here.

Instead of the typical scenario where a

witness stands to gain something by testifying, see,

e.g.,

James,

819 P.2d at 793-94, the jury in the instant action was deprived
of the opportunity to see that Casey's own admissions punished
him.5

All the requirements for a new trial were met.

The lower

court erred in not granting Mr. Kip Massey's motion for a new
trial.

Casey Sanslow?

It wasn't somebody else in the house?"

And both of them said, "We're sure the person that sold us
the gun was the defendant, Kip Massey."
(R 400).
4

Even as of today, Casey Sanslow never had second thoughts
about his guilty plea. Nothing in his name was docketed or filed
for an appeal.
5

No evidence suggests that Casey's confession was part of
a bargain, particularly since he repeatedly maintained his
incriminating position both before and after the entry of his
plea and the Massey verdict. Moreover, there is no possibility
of defendant "A" avoiding a conviction by blaming defendant "B",
and then "B" at his trial avoiding a conviction by blaming "A" .
Kip and Casey did not help each other by using separate
proceedings to point the finger at one another.
21

CONCLUSION
Mr. Massey respectfully requests this Court to reverse
his convictions.
SUBMITTED this

aJ <*-

day of August, 1996

RONALD S. ^FUJINO
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

KIMBERLY A. CLARK
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

Art. I, § 12

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

Amend. V

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.

76-6-408. Receiving stolen property — Duties of pawnbrokers.
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property
of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or
withholding the property from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen,
intending to deprive the owner of it.
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is presumed in the
case of an actor who:
(a) is found in possession or control of other property stolen on a
separate occasion;
(b) has received other stolen property within the year preceding the
receiving offense charged;
(c) being a dealer in property of the sort received, retained, or disposed,
acquires it for a consideration which he knows is far below its reasonable
value; or
(d) if the value given for the property exceeds $20, is a pawnbroker or
person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting used or
secondhand merchandise or personal property, or an agent, employee, or
representative of a pawnbroker or person who buys, receives, or obtains
property and fails to require the seller or person delivering the property to:
(i) certify, in writing, that he has the legal rights to sell the
property;
(ii) provide a legible print, preferably the right thumb, at the
bottom of the certificate next to his signature; and
(iii) provide at least one other positive form of picture identification.
(3) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in
or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, and every
agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or person who fails to
comply with the requirements of Subsection (2)(d) shall be presumed to have
bought, received, or obtained the property knowing it to have been stolen or
unlawfiilly obtained. This presumption may be rebutted by proof.
(4) When, in a prosecution under this section, it appears from the evidence
that the defendant was a pawnbroker or a person who has or operates a
business dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal
property, or was an agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or
person, that the defendant bought, received, concealed, or withheld the
property without obtaining the information required in Subsection (2)(d), then
the burden shall be upon the defendant to show that the property bought,
received, or obtained was not stolen.
(5) Subsections (2)(d), (3), and (4) do not apply to scrap metal processors as
defined in Section 76-10-901.
(6) As used in this section:
(a) "Receives* means acquiring possession, control, or title or lending on
the security of the property;
(b) "Dealer* means a person in the business of buying or selling goods.

76-10-509.9. Sales of firearms to juveniles.
(1) A person may not sell any firearm to a minor under 18 years of age unless
the minor is accompanied by a parent or guardian.
(2) Any person who violates this section is guilty of a third degree felony.

ADDENDUM B

RLED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

KIMBERLY A. CLARK, #5454
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDERS ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

JUL 2 8 1995
S*U iMt COUNTY

By

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

AFFIDAVIT OF CASEY SANSLOW
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No.

KIP LANE MASSEY,

JUDGE KENNETH RIGTRUP

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

951900059FS

)

: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

CASEY SANSLOW, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1. I was charged in this case along with Kip Lane Massey.
2. I hired Randy Ludlow to represent me.
3. The weekend before this offense occurred, I was in Price, Utah, visiting my father,
Terry Sanslow.
4. While I was staying at my father's house, I took the 2.25 caliber Derringer pistol
from his collection, and brought it to Salt Lake with me.
5. The following week, my mother told me that my father's home had been broken
into and all his guns had been stolen. I was worried that I would be blamed for

0G#<03

breaking into my father's house if I were found with the Derringer, so I decided to get
rid of it.
6. I went over to Kip Massey's house to meet with him and he wasn't home. I met
someone on the porch by the name of Travis Kirby and asked him if he wanted to
purchase the gun. I sold the gun to Mr. Kirby at that time for $30.00.
7. Kip was not at home when I sold the gun to Travis Kirby. Kip did not see the
gun, because I did not show it to him.
8. Kip told me that a detective with the Murray Police was looking for me. I called
him the same day and went into the police station. While I was there, I signed a
statement telling the police that I sold the gun to the Kirby's and that Kip had nothing
to do with it.
9. I entered into a plea bargain with the District Attorney's Office to plead guilty to
a third degree felony on this case, before Judge Tyrone E. Medley on April 17,
1995.
10. I was subpoenaed to testify at Kip Massey's trial which was to begin on April 13,
1995. I was advised by my attorney, Randy Ludlow, to invoke my fifth amendment
right against self-incrimination if I were called to testify.
11. I have since entered a plea on this case, have been sentenced and am now
available to testify.
DATED this ^

day of July, 1995.

CASE^SANSLOW

0 CD 1 0 4

Subscribed to and sworn to before me this^EL day of July, 1995.

My Commission Expires

1M/

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake District Attorney's
Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, UT 84111 this

day of July, 1995.
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